(First published 29 June, 2023)
In case you missed it, a submersible was recently presumed lost and later concluded to have imploded during its dive to visit the Titanic wreck, approximately 3800m beneath sea level. As a reference, naval submarines theoretically operate at around 300m deep, and only about five other manned submersibles have ever visited the Titanic wreck. More humans have been to space than the deep sea. Much has been covered in various media outlets that you should definitely check out, but here are some key themes you should be aware of.
On hindsight bias: Reading all the media reports, many obvious conclusions have been drawn by now regarding what should have taken place and what "correct" actions should be. Hindsight bias makes everyone look like experts for concluding the obvious, with words like "should" and "suppose" making sentences sound intelligent. Hindsight bias underplays the context and challenges that led up to the unfortunate event.
On innovation and safety: Oceangate CEO Stockton Rush, who was one of the five that perished, openly argued that safety regulations stifled innovation. As the vessel's designer, he wrongly concluded that the majority of marine (and aviation) accidents are due to operator error and not mechanical failure. In reality, most safety regulations and design requirements are written in blood and backed by scientific evidence. These codes don't have to be complied with, especially if certification is optional, but their fundamental concerns should be objectively and systematically addressed.
On prototype testing: Sadly, the rigor of systematic research and experimentation wasn't appreciated by Rush. Even if you want to rip up the rule book, there remain important questions that need answers, such as how deep the experimental underwater vessel can withstand and for how long. What does failure look like, and what are the contributing risks? Methods such as scale-down models, non-destructive examination, and failure testing are more robust than Oceangate's "experimental approach" of fixing it as they went along. The minimum viable product was perceived to be safe enough until it eventually wasn't.
On responding when someone speaks up: And indeed, many people, from senior staff to a trade group to even one of Rush's own friends, implored him to conduct more safety assessments. Rush either ignored the calls, doubled down against being "over-regulated," or at one point, fired and sued his employees for whistleblowing. Such reactions make it hard for folks to sympathize with Rush, no matter how fearless he appeared to be or how noble the cause was. This is also why, when we teach about speaking up, we always remind everyone that it takes just one bad response to someone speaking up to you before you are left to fend for yourself.
On being entrenched in corporate culture: But what about all the current staff? Would this make them complicit in this reckless and opportunistic extreme tourism pursuit? Past participants repeatedly highlighted the strong safety culture that all crew members exemplified. With all the safety protocols and redundancy systems, there could have been a genuine but false sense of security. Organizational flaws can be hard to detect or alter once you're part of the system, especially when helmed by a charismatic leader who seemed to know what he was doing.
On guiding the misguided: Thus, the big question remains: how do we help powerful individuals who just can't see what is dangerously wrong? Humans fall prey to confirmation bias, self-righteous mentality, Dunning-Kruger effect, and possibly illusion of grandeur among many other imperfections. Amidst the excitement for change, innovation, and entrepreneurship, it is both easy and difficult to be that skeptic naysayer trying to burst someone's endeavor -- easy to say, difficult to make a positive impact. No one will know the harm that was prevented since it never happened. Therein lies the challenge that folks in the business of safety and risk management will always face.
Speak gently to the erring -- know, They may have toiled in vain;
Perchance unkindness made them so; Oh, win them back again! - David Bates
Do you have a Stockton Rush in your life? What would you do to prevent an impending train wreck?
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